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Abstract 
 
Security is a major issue in every field and it impacts more when intruders get the information of 
an individual from the database either directly or indirectly. There are two approaches to break 
the confidentiality, either directly or indirectly. Here we study about different types of techniques 
which protect the confidentiality from indirect disclosure. These techniques are called Inference 
Control Techniques and also known as Statistical Disclosure Control methods. Indirect 
disclosure differs from the other security problems because in this presumptive intruders or 
external users deduce the information by set of available queries having low security risk i.e., 
they do computations on set of available information which is non sensitive and from that 
information they get the sensitive information. Inference control techniques protect the publicly 
released statistics of companies and institutions, such that presumptive user could not get any 
private information about any individual entity. Inference control in statistical databases is a part 
of information security which tries to prevent published statistical information (tables, individual 
records) from disclosing the contribution of specific respondents. Here we shall analyze about 
information loss, disclosure risk measures and performance of the various techniques. The major 
challenge to Statistical Disclosure Control is that modified data should be such that it provides 
more useful information with less disclosure risk i.e., protection should be maximized and 
information loss should be minimized. Since there is a trade-off between information loss and 
disclosure risk i.e., generally it happens that if disclosure risk is less then information loss will be 
more and vice versa. Here we propose some ideas which may provide optimal results.    
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
Before going to the introduction of different Inference Control Techniques first we shall put light 
on existing security problem for databases and for released statistics of companies and firms. 
There are two ways to break the confidentiality, first way is, presumptive intruders get the 
sensitive information from unauthorized access and it is direct way of getting the confidential 
information but  when users get the sensitive information from the set of non sensitive queries 
then it is called the indirect disclosure.  
It is not a security problem like the first problem because in case of direct disclosure the 
intruders and hackers are addicted to access the private information in unauthorized way. In case 
of indirect disclosure even users do not have any type of unauthorized access but they just collect 
some information from a set of non sensitive queries and from that they deduce some 
confidential information. There are many techniques which provide protections from indirect 
disclosure and their classification depends upon the type of data on which they are applied. Some 
techniques are applied on microdata and some on tabular data. As stated in [13] that statistical 
database protection is a part of information security which tries to prevent published statistical 
information (tables, individual records) from disclosing the contribution of specific respondents. 
Also data should be available to researchers and statistical agencies so that the necessary 
research and planning activities can be conducted. If data is not available to the external world 
then it is useless. However, on the other hand, the right of respondents to privacy must be 
protected. As we know technology is growing day by day and the massive use of computers for 
organizing and distributing electronic data, the amount of stored information has had a 
spectacular increase in a very diverse set of fields, namely finance, health care and engineering. 
This enormous increase of stored data in sensitive areas such as health care has led to a new set 
of needs related to information management and privacy protection. Thus, the way to guarantee 
the rights of the respondents whose information is being stored has undergone a substantial 
change. It has become necessary to develop new techniques able to keep the balance between 
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sharing information and protecting individual privacy [11]. Thus the best technique will protect 
the privacy efficiently as well as minimize the information loss. 
 
 
 
            Query  
            
  
               Result 
 
 
Fig. 1: Working principle of inference control techniques 
 
In the above Fig. 1, it is shown that before publication of statistics of any organization the 
original data passes through the operation of inference control techniques and after that the 
resultant of those operations is released in public domain.  
 
 
1.2 Motivation 
 
The motivation behind this work is to study about different inference control techniques for 
performance measure and propose new ideas to produce efficient results with the help of these 
techniques i.e., minimizing both the information loss and disclosure risk to an optimal. It is a 
comparative study of different inference control techniques and here we analyze the performance 
of different techniques that which technique gives the better protection with less information 
loss. Because a data set with major information loss will be useless, i.e. it cannot be used for a 
research purpose unless otherwise it is more accurate and also if original information will be 
published then it will cause to disclosure problem. Sometimes it might be better if we combine 
more than one technique to operate on the same data set which can provide better results than 
applying individual techniques. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Original 
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Chapter 2 
Overview 
 
2.1 Inference Control  
 
Inference control (disclosure control) aim at protecting data from indirect detection. It ensures 
queries of non-sensitive data when put together do not reveal sensitive information. The goal of 
inference control is to prevent the user from completing any inference channel. 
2.2 Inference Channel 
 
A sequence of queries whose responses allow a sensitive inference to be made is known as an 
inference channel. An inference channel is a channel where users can find an item X and then 
use X to derive Y as Y = f(X). 
 
2.3 Application of Inference Control Techniques 
 
 
There are wide ranges of application areas where Inference Control Techniques are used to 
protect the private information of an individual entity from indirect disclosure. Here we refer 
some of the areas of application which are stated in [10]. 
2.3.1 Official Statistics 
 
Most of the organizations, institutions take the services from many statistical agencies to assure 
the confidentiality of released statistics from many organizations and people of the countries 
[10]. Because maintain the confidentiality is the primary issue of any organization so that no can 
get the sensitive information of an individual. 
 
2.3.2 E-Commerce 
 
Today the internet has provided a lot of facilities regarding the business activities. Electronic 
commerce results in the automated collection of large amounts of consumer data. This wealth of 
information is very useful to companies, which are often interested in sharing it with their 
subsidiaries or partners. Such consumer information transfer should not result in public profiling 
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of individuals and is subject to strict regulation. Here protecting the confidentiality and integrity 
of e-commerce data is very essential. 
 
2.3.3 Health Information 
 
 
Health statistics is very important for medical research purpose and for other issues regarding the 
privacy of an individual. There requires the strict regulation of protected health information for 
use in medical research. 
 
2.4 Challenges to Inference Control Techniques 
 
 
The major challenge to inference control techniques is to provide better protection from 
disclosure with very less information loss. The protection provided by ICTQs normally involves 
some degree of data modification, which is an intermediate option between no modification 
(maximum utility, but no disclosure protection) and data encryption (maximum protection but no 
utility for the user without clearance). The challenge for ICTQ is to modify data such that 
sufficient protection is provided while keeping at a minimum the information loss. That is, 
efficient statistical disclosure methods provide less information loss with least disclosure risk.  
 
2.5 Data Types 
  
2.5.1 Microdata 
 
It represents a series of records, each record containing information on an individual entity such 
as a person, a firm, an institution, etc. Here we can see some attributes are sensitive (e.g. SSN, 
Diagnosis type and Income) and no company or organization would like to publish this type of 
sensitive information so before publication of statistics the data should be masked so that 
external users could not get any private information of individuals [14]. 
 
Name SSN Age Zip Diagnosis Income 
Ajay 11543 23 223621 AIDS 17300 
Rakhi 11536 19 223622 AIDS 12456 
Vivek 11524 26 223621 SARS 45213 
Raj 11511 31 223625 SF 15482 
 
Table-1: Records in microdata  
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2.5.2 Masked Microdata 
 
Microdata released for use by third parties, after the data has been masked to limit the possibility 
of disclosure.  In this the identifying information such as names, SSN and other identifying 
information are removed from microdata [14]. We use different inference control techniques to 
modify the data in such a way that from the available information no one can deduce the 
sensitive information. Thus these statistical disclosure control methods give grantee of disclosure 
control and also for optimal result the disclosure risk and information loss should be minimized. 
 
Age Zip Diagnosis Income 
23 223621 AIDS 17300 
19 223622 AIDS 12456 
26 223621 SARS 45213 
31 223625 SF 15482 
   
Table -2: Masked microdata 
 
2.5.3 External Information 
 
Any known information by a presumptive intruder related to some individuals from initial 
microdata. This is the information by the help of this the preemptive intruders can deduce other 
more sensitive information [14]. 
 
Name SSN Age Zip 
Alice 12458 45 458621 
Bob 12478 39 458622 
Rosan 12574 45 458621 
Raj 12635 39 458625 
Alok 14852 45 458621 
 
Table -3: External information 
2.5.4 Tabular Data 
 
In tabular data representation, each cell in the table represents the number of records for a set of 
attributes associated with each other. Here we will refer to an example which illustrates the 
tabular data. Here we see attributes are of categorical type and we see some cell counts are very 
less (e.g. 0, 3…) and by this small count values one can deduce information about an individual 
in merely 2 to 3 steps. So tabular-data protection is a big issue. In the Table-4 we show how the 
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tabular data can be presented and the given cell values are the number of records for a particular 
category. 
 
 
Sex_MS/Age 0-15 16-25 26-35 36-50 >50 
Male_Married 12 9 0 4 21 
Male_Single 0 5 11 8 3 
Female_Married 9 13 47 25 21 
Female_Single 0 14 25 7 17 
 
 
Table-4: Tabular data 
 
 
2.6 Inference Types 
Inferences may be of two types [14], identity disclosure or attribute disclosure, are explained 
below.  
Identity Disclosure: Identification of an entity (person, institution). For example: Vivek is the 
third record, is an identity disclosure in the Table-1. 
Attribute Disclosure: The intruder finds something new about the target person. For example: 
Ajay has AIDS, is an attribute disclosure in the Table-1. 
 
2.7 Protection Types 
 
Here we refer, what types of protection is needed for different types of statistics released by an 
organization [10].  
 
2.7.1 Tabular Data Protection 
 
Previously most of the companies, statistical agencies and other organizations used this method 
to release the statistics. It was the simple method to represent and understand the statistics. 
Tabular data protection is a good method to protect the data because tabular data have been the 
traditional output of national statistical offices. The goal here is to publish static aggregate 
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information, i.e. tables, in such a way that no confidential information on specific individuals 
among those to which the table refers can be inferred. And also in this category there are many 
methods to protect the tabular data. 
 
2.7.2 Microdata Protection 
 
 
As we have discussed about the microdata in the previous section. Here the aim of microdata 
protection is to minimize the disclosure risk for an individual. There are many techniques which 
provide protection for micro data. This method is about protecting static individual data, also 
called microdata. It is only recently that data collectors (statistical agencies and the like) have 
been persuaded to publish microdata. We will discuss protection techniques in the next section 
under this category. 
 
2.7.3 Dynamic Databases 
 
 
User can submit statistical queries (sums, averages, count etc.) to the database. The aggregate 
information obtained by a user as a result of successive queries should not allow him to infer 
information on specific individuals. In the next section we will discuss about two methods; in 
case of one method one can get approximate results for each query but in the second one can get 
the exact information but not for all queries. Some queries will be restricted which will not 
satisfy the criteria. 
 
 
2.8 Example of Disclosure Risk 
 
Here, we refer some examples [1] regarding, how inferences can be made?  
 
2.8.1 Example 1 
Suppose in a department there are many Profs in different- different age groups and the statistics 
is published about the average salary of all Profs and average salary of all Profs with age > 20. 
Think about the case, there is only one Prof whose age < 20. So from the released statistics one 
can easily deduce the salary of Prof whose age <20. 
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Q1=> select avg (salary) from staff; 
Q2=> select avg (salary) from staff where age > 20; 
These both queries make an inference channel and deduce sensitive information. Here Prof 
whose age is less than 20 can be easily deduced by subtraction. Thus this is an indirect disclosure 
in which a user can get the salary of an individual (whose age is less than 20) by simple 
computation on these both queries which are all most non-sensitive in nature. 
 
2.8.2 Example 2  
Consider a Ship-Port management system, here it is shown that with the help of two nonsensitive 
queries, how one can deduce the confidential information. 
 Q1 => select name, port_name from ship;                                           
 Q2 => select port_name from port where portWeapon = „yes‟;                
 
These two queries together constitute an inference channel, because if both are made then it's 
possible to infer exactly which ships are carrying weapons, and this may be sensitive 
information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-
Sensitive 
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Chapter 3 
 
Implementation and Case study 
 
3 Inference Control Techniques 
 
Here we will discuss about different inference control techniques which help the statistical 
agencies, firms and institutions in statistical disclosure control. By the help of these techniques 
the released statistics is protected from inference problem. Most of the inference control 
techniques are classified in two broad categories first is Perturbative (Noise Addition) and 
second is Non-Perturbative [15]. 
 
3.1 Perturbative (Noise Addition) 
 
The microdata set is distorted before publication. In this way, unique combinations of scores in 
the original dataset may disappear and new unique combinations may appear in the perturbed 
dataset; such confusion is beneficial for preserving statistical confidentiality. The perturbation 
method used should be such that statistics computed on the perturbed dataset do not differ 
significantly from the statistics that would be obtained on the original dataset [15]. Add noise to 
the data or to the released statistics. Noise addition provides answers to all queries but the 
answers are approximate. This is further classified as:  
 
• Rounding Techniques 
• Microaggregation 
• Data Swapping 
• Data Perturbation 
• Output Perturbation   
 
3.1.1 Rounding 
 
These are the techniques which are frequently used for protecting the tabular data. Rounding 
methods replace original values of attributes with rounded values. When the table is protected by 
rounding, the cell entropy conditional to the rounded table depends on the rounding base b. Here 
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we will see, how information loss and disclosure risk vary for different base values. We will 
show the process of getting a rounded table from the original table.  
 
Disclosure Risk 
The protection provided by rounding can be measured by the uncertainty about the true values 
determined by it. Therefore, we take the width of the interval containing the possible true value 
for a given rounded value, called existence interval, as measure of protection. We assume that 
the rounding base and the number of jumps allowed are released together with the rounded table 
[13]. In a rounded table without marginals, if the value of a cell x‟i is nib (i.e. n times the 
rounding base), then we know that the original cell xi must lie in the interval: 
 
                      Ii = [(ni – 1/2) b, (ni + 1/2) b] 
 
Seeing the released statistics one can easily deduce the base values because for a table cell values 
will be the multiple of base so from that one can get the base value (For example, suppose the 
cell values are 0, 10, 15, 5..etc. thus here one can directly deduce that the base value will be 5) 
and after getting base values one can deduce the interval by the help of above formula. And after 
getting the base one can also compute the interval Ii and finally the disclosure risk is equal to the 
number of cells in Ii and will be given by the relation highlighted in [13]:    
DR (xi) = 1/ log2m (Ii) 
 
 
Where m (Ii) is the number of possible cell values in Ii and m (Ii) depends upon the value of base 
(b). Now from the above formula we calculate the disclosure risk for different m (Ii) values. If 
number of cell values is more then probability of disclosure risk will be less and if interval length 
is less then disclosure risk is more. For a large base value the disclosure risk will be less but the 
information loss will be more. For example suppose original count of a cell is 3 and for base 
values 5 and 10 it will be rounded to 0, 5 and 10 depending upon the rounding technique used. 
Now we can see for base 5 the interval length m (I)i  will be less as compared to the case of base 
10. Here we see a plot between m (Ii) and disclosure risk. In the figure we have taken possible 
cell counts and for different m (Ii) and we see that the disclosure risk is decreasing for the 
increasing interval length. 
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Fig. 2: Rounding disclosure risk plot 
 
Information Loss  
The information loss of a cell is defined as the distance between the original and the modified 
values of this cell. It can be shown this by the formula given below: 
IL (xi) = x'i   - xi 
Where x'i  = n*b (cell value after rounding) and xi = original cell count. Thus from this linear 
relation we can imagine that if base value will be large then information losses will me more. 
Note: In further explanations, we will indicate the original cell values by z and the rounded 
values by a, b be the rounding base. 
 
 
 
22 
 
3.1.1.1 Systematic Rounding   
In systematic rounding we round a statistic to the closest integer multiple of a fixed rounding 
base b. In this method all values are rounded but this has a demerit that this is not additive. For 
example explained in [1] we see for base (b) = 5, two tables are shown below. 
 
Original Counts: 
a/b b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 Total 
a1 10 0 11 3 9 33 
a2 5 8 7 12 27 59 
a3 3 16 21 7 4 51 
a4 9 10 11 3 9 42 
Total 27 34 50 25 49 185 
 
Table-5: Original cell counts before rounding 
 
After Systematic Rounding: 
a/b b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 Total 
a1 10 0 10 5 10 35 
a2 5 10 5 10 25 60 
a3 5 15 20 5 5 50 
a4 10 10 10 5 10 40 
Total 25 35 50 25 50 185 
 
Table-6: Tabular data after systematic rounding  
Disclosure Problem  
In conventional (systematic) rounding users know that the true value has been rounded to the 
nearest multiple of the base [12]. Hence, the existence intervals that can be computed are: 
 
 
0, 2 if 0
2 , 2 if 0,
z b a
z a b a b a
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Where symbol denotes the floor value. For example [12], if the base is b=5 and a=0, then a user 
can determine that if a=5, then a user can determine that z є [3, 7]. 
 
                   
 
 
From the expressions above it is clear that conventional rounding gives less protection than 
controlled rounding. Broadly speaking, we could say that it is half of that of controlled rounding. 
Information loss plot for different base (b) values: 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Information loss plot for b = 3 and 5. 
 
From the Fig. 3 we perceive that for the large base information loss is more and for the small 
base information loss is less. 
2 if 0
1 if 0,
b a
b a
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3.1.1.2 Random Rounding 
 
 
This technique randomly rounds a statistics either to the next higher or the next lower multiple of 
the rounding base. Considering the previous example in systematic rounding, the table after 
random rounding becomes like given below. 
 
 
a/b b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 Total 
a1 10 0 15 0 10 30 
a2 5 5 10 10 25 55 
a3 0 15 25 10 5 50 
a4 10 10 15 5 5 45 
Total 30 30 50 25 50 185 
 
Table-7: Results after random rounding 
 
 
Fig. 4: Information loss plot for random rounding 
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As we know in case of random rounding for a cell values there can be two possible rounded 
values; one upper rounded value and second is lower rounded value. For example, suppose cell 
value is 2 and base is 5 then after random rounding the result will be either 0 or 5, both 
possibilities are there. Thus in the above plot we have shown both sided rounding i.e., upper as 
well as lower.  
Here we put a plot showing the deviation from the original values in systematic rounding and 
random rounding. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Comparison of results of Systematic and Random Rounding 
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3.1.1.3 Controlled Rounding 
This method of rounding provides an even smaller variance and greater consistency than random 
ranges by requiring the marginal sums of rounded statistics to equal their rounded sum. For 
example, the table in systematic rounding could be modified to meet the requirements for 
controlled rounding by replacing the column-1 sum of 25 with 30 and in column-3 sum of 50 
with 45. Thus controlled rounding is additive i.e. the values in the marginal cells coincide 
with those calculated by adding the relevant interior cells [12]. 
Note: In the above example a1, a2, a3, a4 are the attributes values of Attribute A and b1, b2, b3 , 
b4, b5 are the attributes values of Attribute B and each cell is represented by the number of 
records corresponding to each combination of ai and bi (i =1, 2,…). 
 
For example:  
 
If A represents Sex_Martial-Status then a1, a2, a3, a4 may be represented by Male_Married, 
Male_Unmarried, Female_Married and Female_Unmarried. And if B represents AGE then 
b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 may be represented by the age groups  0-20, 21-35, 36-55, 56-70,  >71. And the 
value of each cell represents the number of records associated with the corresponding attributes 
values. 
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3.1.2 Microaggregation 
Microaggregation comes under perturbative inference control techniques for continuous 
microdata. Here continuous microdata means microdata which attributes are such that one can 
performs numerical and arithmetic operations on that. As stated in [10], the rationale behind 
microaggregation is that confidentiality rules in use allow publication of microdata sets if records 
correspond to groups of k or more individuals, where no individual dominates i.e. contributes too 
much to the group and k is a threshold value. This is the basic principle of microaggregation. 
Raw (individual) data is grouped into small aggregates before publication. The average value of 
the group replaces each value of the individual.  Groups are formed using a criterion of maximal 
similarity. Once the procedure has been completed, the resulting (modified) records can be 
published. This helps to prevent disclosure of individual data. A model for microaggregation as 
described in [17] is given below. 
 
Fig. 6: Micro-aggregation 
 
In this method user can get the results for every query made to database but the results are 
approximate. First original database is converted into averaged database; from that 
microaggregated database the users make query and get the results which are approximate. Here 
information loss depends upon the number of data elements in group formation and how much 
are there values close to each other. Data with the most similarities are grouped together to 
maintain data accuracy.  
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Here we refer an example in which grouping is done of 3-3 data sets and we take average of each 
group (which has sensitive numerical data). Like in the given example we have assumed income 
as sensitive information. 
 
ID Name SSN Age Zip Diagnosis Income 
1 Alice 12458 45 458621 AIDS 17300 
2 Bob 12478 39 458622 AIDS 12456 
3 Rosan 12574 45 458621 SF 19213 
4 Raj 12635 39 458625 SF 15482 
5 Alok 12852 45 458621 SF 12635 
6 Vijay 12845 44 458628 AIDS 12500 
7 John 12863 45 458652 SARS 15600 
8 James 12477 33 458629 AIDS 17500 
9 Alin 12356 33 458622 SARS 17900 
10 Jassica 12475 39 458621 SF 15600 
11 Hagon 12412 50 458623 SF 19200 
 
Table -8: Microdata before micro-aggregation 
 
 
Microaggregation for attribute Income and minimum size 3. The total sum for all Income values 
remains the same. Table after Microaggregation: 
 
ID Age Zip Diagnosis Income 
1 45 458621 AIDS 17566 
8 33 458629 AIDS 17566 
9 33 458622 AIDS 17566 
2 39 458622 AIDS 12530 
5 45 458621 SF 12530 
6 44 458628 AIDS 12530 
4 39 458625 SF 15560 
7 45 458652 AIDS 15560 
10 39 458621 SF 15560 
3 45 458621 SF 19206 
11 50 458623 SF 19206 
 
 
Table-9: Microdata after micro-aggregation 
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If we think from the information loss point of view then an optimal k-partition is defined to be 
the one that maximizes within-group homogeneity; the higher the within group homogeneity, the 
lower the information loss, since microaggregation replaces values in a group by the group 
centroid. Mean to say that if the values in a group will closer to each other then the averaged 
value also will be very close to each value and hence the information loss will be less. 
 Suppose for k = 3, grouping is done for set of values (2.65, 2.78, 2.70), in this case the averaged 
value will be 2.71 and each three values will be replaced by 2.71 and correspondingly the 
information loss will be 0.06, 0.07 and 0.01 which is almost a low value. Now consider an 
example in which values are 2.67, 5.89 and 7.98 for k =3. Here averaged value is 5.51 and 
information loss will be 2.84, 0.38 and 2.47 respectively which are quite large so information 
loss is more due to non homogeneity within the group. 
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Grouping in microaggregation can be done in two ways [10], one fixed size grouping and second 
variable size grouping. There are advantages of variable-sized groups  i.e. variable-size grouping 
results in more homogeneous groups as a result information loss will be less as compared to 
fixed-size grouping. Now here we put an example which might be able to make distinction 
between fixed-size groups and variable-groups i.e. advantage of variable-size groups over the 
fixed-size groups regarding homogeneity which is a major factor deciding information loss. 
 
ID Name SSN Age Zip Diagnosis Income 
1 Alice 12458 45 458621 AIDS 17450 
2 Bob 12478 39 458622 AIDS 12556 
3 Rosan 12574 45 458621 SF 19213 
4 Raj 12635 39 458625 SF 15482 
5 Alok 12852 45 458621 SF 13635 
6 Vijay 12845 44 458628 AIDS 12500 
7 John 12863 45 458652 SARS 15600 
8 Almas 12477 33 458629 SF 13500 
9 Jassica 12475 39 458621 SF 15600 
10 Hagon 12412 30 458623 SF 19200 
11 Roja 15628 36 421622 SF 19206 
12 Bali 15674 35 421621 AIDS 19213 
13 Nikil 15635 49 421625 SF 17412 
14 Suraj 15652 25 421621 AIDS 12590 
15 Shyam 15663 35 421652 SARS 12600 
16 James 15677 30 421629 AIDS 17400 
17 Srijan 15563 33 421656 SARS 17380 
18 Suman 15546 38 421697 SARS 19200 
 
Table-10: Microdata before grouping 
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Suppose group size (k) = 3, now after making fixed-size groups with maximum similarity of 
values. Here grouping is done over the income attribute and we got table as:  
 
ID Name SSN Age Zip Diagnosis Income 
1 Bob 12478 39 458622 AIDS 12556 
2 Shyam 15663 35 421652 SARS 12600 
3 Suraj 15652 25 421621 AIDS 12590 
4 Vijay 12845 44 458628 AIDS 12500 
5 Alok 12852 45 458621 SF 13635 
6 Almas 12477 33 458629 SF 13500 
7 Raj 12635 39 458625 SF 15482 
8 John 12863 45 458652 SARS 15600 
9 Jassica 12475 39 458621 SF 15600 
10 Srijan 15563 33 421656 SARS 17380 
11 James 15677 30 421629 AIDS 17400 
12 Nikil 15635 49 421625 SF 17412 
13 Rosan 12574 45 458621 SF 19213 
14 Suman 15546 38 421697 SARS 19200 
15 Hagon 12412 30 458623 SF 19200 
16 Roja 15628 36 421622 SF 19206 
17 Bali 15674 35 421621 AIDS 19213 
18 Alice 12458 45 458621 AIDS 17450 
 
Table-11: Microdata after fixed-size grouping 
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Table after microaggregation is: 
 
ID Name SSN Age Zip Diagnosis Income 
1 Bob 12478 39 458622 AIDS 12582 
2 Shyam 15663 35 421652 SARS 12582 
3 Suraj 15652 25 421621 AIDS 12582 
4 Vijay 12845 44 458628 AIDS 13211 
5 Alok 12852 45 458621 SF 13211 
6 Almas 12477 33 458629 SF 13211 
7 Raj 12635 39 458625 SF 15560 
8 John 12863 45 458652 SARS 15560 
9 Jassica 12475 39 458621 SF 15560 
10 Srijan 15563 33 421656 SARS 17397 
11 James 15677 30 421629 AIDS 17397 
12 Nikil 15635 49 421625 SF 17397 
13 Rosan 12574 45 458621 SF 19204 
14 Suman 15546 38 421697 SARS 19204 
15 Hagon 12412 30 458623 SF 19204 
16 Roja 15628 36 421622 SF 18623 
17 Bali 15674 35 421621 AIDS 18623 
18 Alice 12458 45 458621 AIDS 18623 
 
Table-12: Microdata after microaggregation with fixed-size groups 
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In general value of k ≥ 3 but here we assume that k ≥ 2 thus in case of variable-size grouping the 
table will look like as given below: 
 
ID Name SSN Age Zip Diagnosis Income 
1 Bob 12478 39 458622 AIDS 12556 
2 Shyam 15663 35 421652 SARS 12600 
3 Suraj 15652 25 421621 AIDS 12590 
4 Vijay 12845 44 458628 AIDS 12500 
5 Alok 12852 45 458621 SF 13635 
6 Almas 12477 33 458629 SF 13500 
7 Raj 12635 39 458625 SF 15482 
8 John 12863 45 458652 SARS 15600 
9 Jassica 12475 39 458621 SF 15600 
10 Srijan 15563 33 421656 SARS 17380 
11 James 15677 30 421629 AIDS 17400 
12 Nikil 15635 49 421625 SF 17412 
13 Alice 12458 45 458621 AIDS 17450 
14 Rosan 12574 45 458621 SF 19213 
15 Suman 15546 38 421697 SARS 19200 
16 Hagon 12412 30 458623 SF 19200 
17 Roja 15628 36 421622 SF 19206 
18 Bali 15674 35 421621 AIDS 19213 
 
Table-13: Microdata after variable-size grouping  
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Table after microaggregation is: 
 
ID Name SSN Age Zip Diagnosis Income 
1 Bob 12478 39 458622 AIDS 12561 
2 Shyam 15663 35 421652 SARS 12561 
3 Suraj 15652 25 421621 AIDS 12561 
4 Vijay 12845 44 458628 AIDS 12561 
5 Alok 12852 45 458621 SF 13567 
6 Almas 12477 33 458629 SF 13567 
7 Raj 12635 39 458625 SF 15560 
8 John 12863 45 458652 SARS 15560 
9 Jassica 12475 39 458621 SF 15560 
10 Srijan 15563 33 421656 SARS 17410 
11 James 15677 30 421629 AIDS 17410 
12 Nikil 15635 49 421625 SF 17410 
13 Alice 12458 45 458621 AIDS 17410 
14 Rosan 12574 45 458621 SF 19206 
15 Suman 15546 38 421697 SARS 19206 
16 Hagon 12412 30 458623 SF 19206 
17 Roja 15628 36 421622 SF 19206 
18 Bali 15674 35 421621 AIDS 19206 
 
Table-14: Microdata after microaggregation with variable-size groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Here we show a plot comparing fixed-size grouping and variable-size grouping with respect to 
the original dataset. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Comparison of results of fixed-size and variable-size grouping 
 
As we see in the plot that curve of microaggregation with fixed-size groups is more distorted 
than the variable-size groups. Hence information loss will be more in case of fixed-size grouping 
than the variable-size grouping due to maximum similarity of records in variable-size groups i.e. 
due to homogeneity of the groups. 
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3.1.3 Data Swapping 
In the current time user‟s needs are increasing towards the more detailed and larger microdata 
files and accordingly their demand is increased now days. Previously disclosure control 
techniques are not enough sufficient to mask the anonymity of the respondents. When used in 
conjunction with the other techniques, data swapping may be a feasible procedure to adequately 
mask data files while providing users with more information.  
As stated in [19] one of the first references to data swapping is found in Reiss (1980). In his 
article, the author describes interchanging values of individual records within a highly visible 
field. The swap protects the univariate distribution of that variable. Since its value belongs to 
some other respondent, each respondent's anonymity is protected.  
In this disclosure method a sequence of so-called elementary swaps is applied to a microdata. An 
elementary swap consists of two actions: (i) a random selection of two records i and j from the 
microdata. (ii) A swap (interchange) of the values of the attribute being swapped for records i 
and j.  
Here we refer this example; a microdata file for 11 respondents is provided. In order to protect 
the anonymity of the respondents, income values are randomly swapped among the records.  
 
 
ID Age Zip Diagnosis Income 
1 45 458621 AIDS 17500 
2 39 458622 AIDS 12500 
3 45 458621 SF 19200 
4 39 458625 SF 15482 
5 45 458621 SF 12500 
6 44 458628 AIDS 12456 
7 45 458652 AIDS 15600 
8 33 458629 AIDS 17500 
9 33 458622 AIDS 17900 
10 39 458621 SF 15600 
11 50 458623 SF 19200        
 
Table-15: Microdata before swapping 
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ID Age Zip Diagnosis Income 
1 45 458621 AIDS 17500 
2 39 458622 AIDS 12456 
3 45 458621 SF 19200 
4 39 458625 SF 15600 
5 45 458621 SF 12500 
6 44 458628 AIDS 12500 
7 45 458652 AIDS 15482 
8 33 458629 AIDS 17500 
9 33 458622 AIDS 17900 
10 39 458621 SF 15600 
11 50 458623 SF 19200 
 
Table-16: Microdata after swapping 
 
We see in the Table-16 that records 1 & 3 are swapped with records having the same income 
therefore for these respondents, swap has provided no masking.  
As stated in [19], the probability that a swap has masked a particular record is inversely 
proportional to the frequency of its value appearing in the file. For large data files, this is 
acceptable. An income which appears frequently in a microdata file does not as easily identify 
the respondent as one which appears very rarely. The reason is that more number of records 
having same income decreases the disclosure risk of a particular individual as many respondents 
have the same income so a presumptive intruder cannot identify a record by income.  
The basic idea behind the method is to transform a database by exchanging values of confidential 
attributes among individual records. Records are exchanged in such a way that low-order 
frequency counts or marginals are maintained. Here data swapping is introduced to protect 
continuous and categorical microdata, respectively. In data swapping exact disclosure is not 
possible but partial disclosure is possible. 
In a microdata file swap can be performed on more fields which are deemed to be sensitive. Like 
in the Table-15, suppose age is also treated as sensitive then it may also be swapped randomly. 
Remember that random swap of age can differ from the random swap of income. Independent 
multiple random data swaps can be used in succession [19]. These independent multiple random 
data swaps further ensures that the resulting file has adequately masked accurate information 
about each respondent.  
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3.1.4 Data Perturbation  
 
In this method first noise is added to the raw data and perturbed database is made. Replaces 
original data with another sample drawn from the same probability distribution. User can query 
to the perturbed database rather than the original database. Thus here user can get the 
approximate result. The pro and cons are like; pro: With perturbed databases, if unauthorized 
data is accessed, the true value is not disclosed.  Con: Data perturbation runs the risk of 
presenting biased data. 
 
 
               Query 
    Noise Added                    Results 
 
          Results  
                      
Query    
 
Fig. 8: Data perturbation 
 
As described in [17] a model for data perturbation is given in Fig. 8. The data-perturbation 
approach usually requires that a dedicated transformed database is created for statistical research. 
If the original database is also used for other purposes, the original database and the transformed 
SDB are both maintained by the system. It is important to note that this approach has a large risk 
of introducing bias to quantities such as the conditional means and frequencies. 
In data perturbation method bias problem is much severe. Bias refers to the difference between a 
true statistic and the expectation of its perturbed estimate. The bias should be zero or at least as 
small as possible [1]. As described in [1] consistency means lack of contradictions and paradoxes 
in the perturbed statistics. Inconsistency arises, e.g. when repetitions of the same query give the 
different results. Paradoxes arise when negative or fractional values are returned for counts. 
Original 
Database 
 
Perturbed 
Database 
User 1 
User 2 
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These both factors bias and consistency play a vital role in measuring the performance of the 
perturbation techniques. 
 
3.1.5 Output Perturbation 
 
 
Instead of the raw data being transformed as in Data Perturbation, only the output or query 
results are perturbed. As stated in [17], the interaction of users with the database is given below. 
  
 
     Query 
                          Results  
        Noise Added to Results 
       
                Results 
 Query                                  
        
    
Fig. 9: Output perturbation 
 
 
The bias problem is less severe than with data perturbation. This is due to the fact that the query 
set selected under the output-perturbation approach is based on the original values, not the 
perturbed values. In this method noise is added to the results of the query.  
 
 
 
 
Original 
Database 
User 2 
User 1 
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3.2 Non-Perturbative 
Non-Perturbative methods do not alter data; rather, they produce partial suppressions or 
reductions of detail in the original dataset. In this category if a query satisfies the condition then 
the accurate result will be come. There are many techniques in this category which we will 
discuss one by one. 
 
• Table Restriction 
• Query Restriction 
• Cell Suppression 
 
3.2.1 Table Restriction 
Table-level controls restrict complete tables of statistics, namely those higher dimensional tables 
in the lattice that have, or are likely to have, a positive disclosure or identification risk (i.e., one 
or more cells corresponding to a single individual). This method incurs large information loss as 
for protecting few elements in the table one has to restrict the whole table data.  
 
3.2.1.1 Relative Table Size Control 
Restricts an m-table of counts if its relative size Sm/N 
[1]
 exceeds a threshold 1/k, where k is a 
parameter of the database chosen to reduce, but not necessarily eliminate, the possibility of 
disclosure. Thus, an m-table is permitted if the average number of records falling into each cell is 
at least k. Sm is the number of cells in a table and Sm is the product of domain sizes for the 
attributes named in the characteristic formula (query formula). Here a table is published only if it 
is k permitted. We refer the method of protecting the table statistics, i.e. what computations are 
made for a table and on what basis a table is permitted or restricted.  
We refer this example as stated in [1]. Let k = 10, N = 185(total no. of records in database), 
domain sizes of attributes are |A| = 4, |B| = 5, |C| = 8, |D| = 2 and applying above criteria only 8 
of the 16 tables are permitted. We calculate the Sm value by multiplying the domain sizes of the 
attributes. 
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Results 
    Table  Sm  Sm/N   Status 
 TALL  1  0.005  Permitted 
 TA  4  0.022   Permitted 
 TB  5  0.027  Permitted 
 TC  8  0.043  Permitted 
 TD  2  0.011  Permitted 
 TAB  20  0.108  Restricted 
 TBC  40  0.216  Restricted 
 TCD  16  0.086  Permitted 
 TAC  32  0.173  Restricted 
 TAD  8  0.043  Permitted 
 TBD  10  0.054  Permitted 
 
As we see here that tables which have the Sm/N values less than 1/k are permitted. All other 
tables have the Sm/N value greater than 1/k (=0.1), so they all are restricted. Identification risk in 
an m-table will be approximately e
-N/Sm
.  
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 We refer this example of [1] and calculate the disclosure risk for the given tabular data: 
 
 
Zero table: 
                     
  
                             One table 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
                                Two-table 
 
 
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
Table-17: Tables of sizes 0, 1, 2. 
 
 
        N/Sm       e
-N/Sm
 
 
9.25 9.61E-05 
37 8.53E-17 
46.25 8.20E-21 
185 4.52E-81 
    
 
 
185 
a1 33 
a2 59 
a3 51 
a4 42 
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 
27 34 50 25 49 
a/b b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 
a1 10 0 11 3 9 
a2 5 8 7 12 27 
a3 3 16 21 7 4 
a4 9 10 11 3 9 
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3.2.1.2 Order Control 
As stated in [1] it restricts all m-tables of counts for m > d where the threshold d is a parameter 
of the database. The parameter d is chosen so that most, if not all, statistics in the permitted m-
tables are nonsensitive (or are expected to be nonsensitive). The control is easily implemented by 
counting the number of attributes appearing in the characteristic formula of a query, if there are 
more than d attributes, the query is not answered. 
Results 
d – Value          Table-size       Status (table statistics) 
 0       0               Permitted   
     > 0               Restricted 
 1     0, 1                Permitted  
     > 1               Restricted 
 2     0, 1, 2    Permitted 
     > 2               Restricted 
 
3.2.2 Query Restriction  
 
Query restriction rejects a query which can lead to a compromise, but the answers in query 
restriction are always accurate. In this the main techniques is Query Set-Size Control which is 
explained in this section. 
3.2.2.1 Query Set-Size Control 
 
 
As stated in [2] a query is not answered if it contains too few or too many records. A query-set 
size control can limit the number of records that must be in the result set. The query-set-size 
control method permits a statistic to be released only if the size of the query set R (i.e., the 
number of entities included in the response to the query) satisfies the condition. It allows the 
query results to be displayed only if the size of the query set satisfies the condition.  
Setting a minimum query-set size can help protect against the disclosure of individual data. 
o Let K represents the minimum number or records to be present for the query set. 
o Let R represents the size of the query set. 
o The query set can only be displayed if 
44 
 
                                                            K  R  L-K 
Where L is the size of the database (the number of entities represented in the database) and K is 
a parameter set by the DBA. K should satisfy the condition: 
0  K  (L/2) 
Notice that K cannot exceed L/2; otherwise no statistics would ever be released. 
 
We refer this example which shows the overview of query set- size control approach. Here we 
see if the result of a query exceeds the k value then the result will not be published.  
 
Let k=3  
 
Q1 => COUNT (birth place = „rkl‟ and street no = „A123‟) = 5; is allowed. 
 
Q2 => COUNT (birth place = „rkl‟ and street no. not „A123‟) = 2; is not allowed. 
 
In this figure taken from [17], the process of query set restriction is explained. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
QQ          K    Query   
  K    Query               Results 
         Results 
 
                  Restricted           Permitted 
 
Fig. 10: Query set-size control 
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Results 
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In the above example we see that if the query result size is less than the k value then that query 
(also query result) is not published.  
Results of Query set size control 
 
With query set size control the database can be easily compromised within a frame of 4-5 
queries. For query set control, if the threshold value k is large, then it will restrict too many 
queries. And still does not guarantee protection from compromise. 
 
3.2.3 Cell Suppression 
This method is used to protect data published in tabular form. The basic idea behind this 
approach is to remove the sensitive cells which can cause disclosure of individual data. The 
linear relations among all cells of a table (including the marginal sums in the parent tables) are 
analyzed to determine whether sensitive cells can be deduced (exactly or approximately) from 
those that are released; additional cells, called complementary suppressions, are suppressed for 
as long as possible [1].  
In tabular data, the general procedure to define a cell as sensitive (disclosure cell) is that if cell 
contains statistics computed over less than t (a threshold defined) individual records. When cells 
contain frequencies, are less than t then those cells are called disclosure cells. Once a disclosure 
cell X has been identified, a disclosure interval I(X) is determined [16]. Here we refer an 
example as explained in [13] to compute the disclosure risk for cell suppression. Suppose the 
table after suppression with marginal sums is given as: 
 
MS/AGE 0-15 16-25 26-35 36-50 >50 Total 
Single 1234 656 415 125 698 3128 
Married 457 x1 789 896 x2 2956 
Divorced 856 x3 587 621 x4 3894 
Total 2547 3057 1791 2436 2215 8878 
 
Table-18: Tabular data after cell suppression 
 
46 
 
Let‟s all cells contain the positive integer values. From the above table it can be made linear 
equations like: 
 
x1 | x1 + x2 = 814,  x1 + x3 = 2401, xi ≥ 0 
x2 | x1 + x2 = 814,  x2 + x4 = 1517, xi ≥ 0 
x3 | x1 + x3 = 2401,  x3 + x4 = 1830, xi ≥ 0 
x4 | x3 + x4 = 1830,  x2 + x4 = 1517, xi ≥ 0 
 
As stated in [13] the disclosure risk for each suppressed cell is computed by the following 
formula: 
DR(X) = 1/ log2 m (Sy(X)) 
 
where m (Sy(X))
 
 is the number of possible values of the cell in Sy(X). Sy(X) is computed by 
solving two linear programming (LP) problems (one maximization and one minimization) and 
then subtracting the solutions.  
 
      Cell suppression is basically of two types; one is primary suppression and second is 
secondary suppression. In primary suppression the cell only which is disclosure cell (sensitive) is 
suppressed but due to linear relations between the cell values (marginal sums) some additional 
non-sensitive (non-disclosure cells) are also suppressed to provide required interval protection to 
X, thus determining and suppressing those additional cells is called secondary suppression [16].       
If we consider these both patterns then we see that in case of secondary suppression information 
loss is more so to get good performance it is needy that information loss should be less and for 
that we have to choose secondary suppression such that the number of suppressed cells is 
minimal.  
As stated in [1] a secondary suppression methodology, in which suppressed cells fall into 
hypercube of size 2
m
, where m is the size of the table. Some attempt is made in selecting cells 
for suppression to minimize information loss.  
Here we refer an example of [1] which shows how cell suppression can be used to protect the 
sensitive cell T [3, 1]. 
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MS/AGE 0-15 16-25 26-35 36-50 >50 Total 
Single 1234 656 415 125 698 3128 
Married   789 896 856 2956 
Divorced   587 621 456 3894 
Total 2547 3057 1791 2436 2215 8878 
 
Table-19:  Secondary Cell suppression (Hypercube method) 
 
In hypercube method of secondary cell suppression number of suppressed cells depends upon the 
size of the table i.e. 2
m
 where m is the size of the table [1]. We can show a plot of variation of 
number of suppressed cells versus table size. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11: Variation of no. of Suppressed cells w.r.t Table-size.  
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Chapter 4 
Results and Discussion 
Study after so many techniques we came to know about their performance. Also we came to 
know that no single inference control method alone satisfies the conflicting aim of high 
protection, low information loss, and efficiency, thus to achieve these all properties at the same 
time one has to combine more control methods. A scheme that combines simple restriction 
criteria, such as query-set size and relative table size, with simple perturbation techniques can 
provide an acceptable level of protection for many applications without being overly restrictive 
or costly. For applications requiring extremely high levels of security or low levels of 
information loss, the techniques such as cell suppression and controlled rounding can be used-
although at the rate of increased cost. The best strategy for a particular application will depend 
on its objectives and risks. 
If we consider rounding methods then we see that out of three methods explained here controlled 
rounding is better than the other two in the sense of minimizing information loss. Rounding 
techniques may be either zero-restricted or k-restricted [13] and if we consider then in case of k-
restricted disclosure is difficult than in case of zero-restricted. Because in case of k-restricted a 
value is rounded k times of the rounding base. For example; suppose rounding base is 5 and 
value to be rounded is 3 then in case of zero-restricted it will be either 0 or 5 depending upon the 
3 methods used but in case of k-restricted it will become any of these values like  0, 5, 10, 
15,…(depending upon k value). Thus it is difficult to find the existence interval in k-restricted 
rounding than the zero-restricted.   
In case of microaggregation as it is explained that variable-size grouping is more preferable than 
the fixed-size grouping regarding the information loss.  
Considering data perturbation and output perturbation, output perturbation is better than the data 
perturbation because in case data perturbation a different perturbed database is created and from 
that database users can query only and in this method bias problem is more severe than the 
output perturbation method as in case of output perturbation only the results of the queries are 
perturbed rather than whole database is perturbed i.e. noise is added to the results of the queries. 
In output perturbation the bias problem is less severe as compared to the output perturbation. 
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In non-perturbative techniques, it may be all queries are not answered but the results of these 
techniques are accurate i.e. if a query is satisfying the criteria then result will be published and if 
not then nothing will be come out. As it is explained in perturbative techniques the results of 
each and every query is answered but the only thing is that all results are approximate. So it can 
be said that in case of perturbative techniques information loss has no significant meaning i.e. it 
is meaningless because for a particular data we get the accurate results not the perturbed one, so 
only thing here matters that up to what extent one can get the information and what is the 
percentage of disclosure risk.  
Finally so many techniques are there but the protection and information loss depends upon the 
type of method used for a particular dataset and it varies from one technique to another 
technique.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Future Work 
After study of different Inference Control Techniques , we come to know that  Information Loss 
and  Disclosure Risk both varies reversely, that is; if  information loss is more then disclosure 
risk will be less and vice versa. So far, here we come to a conclusion that, for achieving good 
performance, that is the Information loss as well as Disclosure risk both to be minimized, we will 
have to combine more techniques to get an optimal result and no single method can provide full 
protection as well as minimize the information loss simultaneously. Like if we consider a case in 
very few cells are not satisfying the k criteria in a table and due to that whole table is restricted. 
Suppose instead of applying relative table size control we apply cell suppression method in this 
we can avoid from more information loss as compared to relative size control. So a better choice 
of a disclosure control method gives better performance in the sense of low information loss and 
low disclosure risk. Also combining more techniques on the same dataset will give more 
valuable results.  
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